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Fishing for More 
Effective Incentives
IN THEIR REPORT “CAN CATCH SHARES PRE-
vent fisheries collapse?” (19 September
2008, p. 1678), C. Costello et al. present
empirical evidence to support the view that
providing incentives for fishers by allocating
them shares in the catch [individual trans-
ferable quotas (ITQs)] can halt, or even
reverse, the trend toward increasing collapse
of fisheries. We do not dispute that correct
incentives are important in solving fishery
problems, but we urge caution in interpreting
and acting on these results. 
Adoption of ITQs does not always prevent
overfishing, as illustrated by several stocks
managed by ITQs in Australia and New
Zealand (1). ITQs are a blunt economic
instrument and may actually create perverse
incentives. For example, “high-grading”
(discarding fish of lower market value to
maximize returns from the catch share) is a
common feature of such systems. Partial
rights allocation (a common feature where
fish cross jurisdictional boundaries) can
result in both misreporting and failure to con-
trol catches (2). In multispecies fisheries,
restrictions on quota species can lead to
targeting and overfishing on commercial
species not in the quota system. Placing all
species in the quota system leads to very
expensive fishery management systems, and
rights allocation tends to be an irreversible
decision short of complete government buy-
out of a fishery. Furthermore, like other man-
agement regimes based on strong property
rights, ITQ management can lead to litigious
behavior and attract speculators.
Costello et al. focus on overfishing of tar-
get species, but fishery managers now have to
consider and manage broader ecological
impacts of fishing (3), and it is not clear that
catch shares create incentives to deal with
these problems. For example, major global
issues include both bycatch (catch and dis-
carding of noncommercial species) and the
impacts of fishing on benthic habitats and
communities (4, 5). Once private property
rights have been allocated, it may prove diffi-
cult for regulators to protect benthic habitats
and associated and dependent noncommer-
cial species (6).
Concerns about overfishing and wider
ecological impacts of fishing have prompted a
variety of solutions to the fisheries manage-
ment problem. Those who despair of tradi-
tional approaches tend to favor alternatives
such as widespread use of areas closed to fish-
ing (e.g., marine protected areas) (7). Those
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Grants on the Run
THE EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM TO
Stimulate Competitive Research
(EPSCoR) was designed to help
U.S. states with limited facilities
improve their research infrastruc-
ture in order to make them more
competitive for nationwide grants,
such as the R01. Twenty-seven
states and territories (including
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands) have been designated
EPSCoR states (1). In a recent
Letter (“Declines in NIH R01
research grant funding,” 10 Octo-
ber 2008, p. 189), H. G. Mandel and E. S. Vesell presented the current funding statistics for
R01 grants. These findings and other changes in policy (2) demonstrate the difficulty in getting
R01 grants funded in the current climate. The existing funding situation encourages investiga-
tors from EPSCoR states to take their R01 grants and leave for better institutions because bet-
ter institutions have the resources to obtain new R01 grants and renew R01 grants. 
How can institutions in EPSCoR states retain their scientists with R01 grants under these
difficult conditions? It may be necessary to offer extremely competitive financial packages to
scientists from elsewhere with R01s or to change the promotion and tenure policies. Perhaps
scientists who have R01s could receive early promotion and tenure, or the tenure clock could
be extended to give scientists more time to obtain an R01. 
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Letters to the Editor
Letters (~300 words) discuss material published 
in Science in the previous 3 months or issues of
general interest. They can be submitted through
the Web (www.submit2science.org) or by regular
mail (1200 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC
20005, USA). Letters are not acknowledged upon
receipt, nor are authors generally consulted before
publication. Whether published in full or in part,
letters are subject to editing for clarity and space.
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with more direct experience of fisheries tend
to stress the importance of incentives, of
which catch shares are the most common (but
not only) example (2). We agree with the
importance of incentives but distrust any
single-factor solutions to overfishing and
other fishery issues. In our experience, solu-
tions to most real-world fisheries problems
are likely to comprise a package of measures,
including (where appropriate) ITQs, spatial
management, effort and gear restrictions, as
well as removal of excessive subsidies.
TONY SMITH,* MARK GIBBS, DAVID SMITH
Wealth from Oceans National Flagship and CSIRO Marine
and Atmospheric Research, Australia.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail:
tony.d.smith@csiro.au
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Diverse Fisheries Require
Diverse Solutions
WE APPLAUD C. COSTELLO ETAL.’S  REPORT “CAN
catch shares prevent fisheries collapse?” (19
September 2008, p. 1678) for empirically
evaluating one solution to fisheries collapses—
individual transferable quotas (ITQs)—but
worry about promoting a single, prescriptive
solution for diverse global fisheries based on
the overly simplistic premise of “getting
incentives right” (1–3). Examples of ITQs
considered by Costello et al. come from
developed countries with strong governance
and temperate or subtropical ecosystems with
low relative diversity; these conditions favor
single-species fisheries. Hence, the results do
not represent catch shares generally and can-
not be extrapolated globally to model the
recovery of the world’s predominantly small-
scale and data-poor fisheries.
ITQs raise social issues that should not be
ignored, such as the effects of consolidation,
lost livelihoods, restricted resource access,
allocation by historical privilege, and reduced
local investment (4). These undermine the
local stewardship and “individual incentives”
necessary for successful implementation of
ITQs (3). Without solutions to issues of
equity, population growth coupled with
increases in ITQ-managed fisheries could
lead fishers displaced from formerly open-
access areas to pursue illegal, unregulated,
and unreported fishing or to fish other
species within ITQ zones. 
To stem collapse and begin recovery, the
world’s fisheries need diverse and practical
management measures, including ITQs as
well as marine protected areas, traditional user
rights, and minimum/maximum size limits,
among others (5, 6). 
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Response 
OUR REPORT (BY J.L., C.C., AND S.D.G.)
should not be read as a blinkered push for
individual transferable quotas (ITQs). We
agree that ITQs are not a panacea; we simply
used them as a convenient subset of rights-
based management to test whether Worm et
al.’s prediction (1) of 100% collapse holds
true for rights-based fisheries. The data used
by Worm et al. are aggregated over large spa-
tial areas, and ITQ fisheries are the only
rights-based fisheries that are implemented
on a similar scale. 
We showed in our Report that, on average,
ITQ-managed fisheries are significantly less
prone to collapse than are non-ITQ fisheries.
However, simply switching to ITQs does not
guarantee ecological and social benefits: Total
allowable catches (TACs) must still be set
appropriately, and design must account for
social objectives. Fisheries are complex inter-
actions between ecosystems and human
societies where market incentives can fail for
a variety of reasons. For example, when
enforcement is inadequate, species with little
economic value may still be discarded. Quota
holders may support the depletion rather than
the sustainable harvest of species with excep-
tionally low productivity. Separation between
those who harvest the fish and those who set
the quota can compromise the incentives for
sustainable harvesting. Component popula-
tions may be depleted if the geographic scale
of management exceeds the geographic scale
of these populations. 
Smith et al. raise a range of valid concerns
about the ecological impacts of ITQs (such as
bycatch and high-grading). However, ITQs
can result in quota holders encouraging more
restrictive TACs, reducing levels of bycatch,
and supporting conservation measures such as
marine protected areas (2–4). Branch et al. (5)
found no evidence that ITQs cause an increase
in high-grading. In Canada, multispecies
ITQs were observed to be no more expensive
to enforce than existing regulations (6).
Learning from this rich range of experience is
fundamental to improving fisheries manage-
ment generally and to applying rights-based
mechanisms in particular.
Similarly, Ban et al. raise justifiable con-
cerns about the socioeconomic impacts of
ITQ implementation. Potential for consolida-
tion and lost livelihoods should be part of any
discussion on implementing rights-based
management and balanced against expected
societal gains from enhanced management.
As noted by our Report, there are many rights-
based alternatives to ITQs. 
Despite these caveats, we strongly dis-
agree that “getting incentives right” is an
overly simplistic premise. Our Report tested
and validated Hilborn et al.’s (7) hypothesis
that sustainable fishing will occur when insti-
tutional incentives encourage participants to
behave in ways that society considers benefi-
cial. Other premises (such as Ban et al.’s
argument that equity is essential for sustain-
ability) should also be tested with the same
degree of rigor. 
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A Question of Ethics
IN “DO WE NEED ‘SYNTHETIC BIOETHICS’?”
(Policy Forum, 12 September 2008, p. 1449),
E. Parens et al. warn of a further “balkaniza-
tion” of bioethics: the tendency to divide
bioethics into ever more subfields (such as
gen-ethics and neuro-ethics), each of which
lacks awareness of the general ethical ques-
tions common to all areas. According to the
Policy Forum, the ethics of synthetic biology is
just the latest offspring in a line of ethical
enterprises of debatable value. Parens et al. use
our commentary on synthetic biology’s ethical
implications (1) as an example of this trend. 
We did not call for the inauguration of
“synthetic bioethics” as a new field of
inquiry. However, we do claim that the ethi-
cal issues raised by synthetic biology differ
from those raised by genetic engineering.
Synthetic biology constitutes a shift from
manipulation (the optimization of known
organisms) to creation (the vision of nature
as blank space to be filled with whatever
organisms one might devise). We must inte-
grate synthetic biology’s specific character-
istics with the thornier questions of general
ethical provenance. 
JOACHIM  BOLDT* AND OLIVER  MÜLLER
Department of Medical Ethics and History, University of
Freiburg, Freiburg,  Germany.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail:
joachim.boldt@uniklinik-freiburg.de
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Response
WE REGRET THAT BOLDT AND MÜLLER INTER-
preted our Policy Forum as charging them
with balkanizing bioethics and calling for
such a subfield; they do not call for this, nor
did we say that they do.
Boldt and Müller do claim that synthetic
biology raises new ethical issues, and on this
we differ. We think that “creating” life in the
context of synthetic biology raises the same
ethical question that is raised by “manipulat-
ing” life in the context of genetic engineering
(and in contexts such as assisted human repro-
duction, embryonic stem cell research, or ani-
mal-human chimeras). The question is:
Should there be any in-principle limits on our
capacity to transform ourselves and the rest of
the natural world? 
If Boldt and Müller are right and synthetic
biology raises fundamentally new ethical
issues, then someone would have solid ground
on which to argue for a new bioethical sub-
field. If we are right, it makes better sense to
just drill down with this thorny old question.
ERIK PARENS,* JOSEPHINE JOHNSTON,
JACOB MOSES 
The Hastings Center, Garrison, NY 10524, USA.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail:
parense@thehastingscenter.org
CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
News of the Week: “European Union floats tighter animal-
research rules” by G. Vogel (14 November 2008, p. 1037).
The article referred to lampreys as invertebrates. Lampreys,
however, have backbones. The new European Union regula-
tions regarding animal research list Cyclostomes as “inverte-
brate species” that should be regulated. Cyclostomes include
hagfish (which lack a vertebral column) and lampreys. 
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